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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
reason to believe that it may yet be done; the Court's lan-
guage in several instances so indicates. In Ervin v. Brown,
the Court said: "The occupation by the appellees' decedent
could not be considered to be provisional."8 And in Ridgely
v. Lewis," the Court said that, "... certainly, in the instant
case, there is to be found that there was nothing pro-
visional in the holding and use of Parcel A."85
In as much as these statements were contained in two of
the very cases repudiating the distinction between condi-
tional and absolute intent in mistake cases, it is submitted
that the only logical reason for which the statements could
have been made is that the Court visualized situations in
which there could be one of two types of intent, such situa-




At 11 A.M. on January 5, 1953, Mrs. Pauline M. Shriner
was driving an automobile owned by her husband, Mr.
Marlin L. Shriner, east along a hard paved, public highway.
Evidence was conflicting as to the speed at which she was
driving. The weather was clear and the road was dry. As
she drove over the crest of a hill she saw ahead a tractor
with a manure spreader attached, blocking the highway.
The entire piece of equipment measured twenty-three feet
eleven inches in length and weighed approximately 7,200
pounds. The equipment had just entered the highway from
a private dirt driveway belonging to Mr. Joseph H. Mull-
hausen. The equipment also belonged to Mr. Mullhausen
and his son was at the wheel. The two vehicles collided at
the intersection.
Mrs. Shriner brought suit against both Mullhausens in
the Circuit Court of Carroll County for personal injuries
doubt included discussions by the disseisor's wife with the builder that the
garage may have been over the boundary, and similar statements made
to the disselsee. Evidence of conditional intent appeared from statements
in regard to moving the garage off of the disseisee's property.
" 204 Md. 136, 144, 102 A. 2d 806 (1954).
9 204 Md. 56, 105 A. 2d 212 (1953) - another case reiterating the doc-
trine of the Tamburo case.
MIbid, 567.
Class of 1956, University of Maryland School of Law.
'210 Md. 104, 122 A. 2d 570 (1956).
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resulting from the accident. The defendants filed a general
issue plea and, in addition, Joseph, the father, filed a
counter-claim for damages to his tractor. Mr. Shriner sued
the defendants for the loss of his wife's services, expenses
of medical treatments and damages to his automobile.
The cases were tried together before a jury which ren-
dered verdicts in favor of all defendants; judgments for
costs were entered against the Shriners. A verdict on the
counter-claim by Mr. Mullhausen was entered in favor of
Mrs. Shriner; judgment for costs was rendered in her favor.
No appeal was taken by the father on the judgment against
him for costs on his counter-claim. On appeal by the
Shriners from the Circuit Court's denial of a prayer for
directed verdict,' the Court of Appeals held, per Collins, J.,
reversed and remanded. The Court, in extending the de-
cisions construing the boulevard stop statutes' to the statute
dealing with unpaved or private roads intersecting un-
marked paved highways,4 reasoned that since the younger
Mullhausen moved slow and bulky farm equipment onto a
paved public highway from a private road and did not yield
the right of way to the oncoming vehicle, he was guilty of
negligence as a "matter of law",5 the same as if he had
moved the equipment from a "stop" street onto a through
highway. Further, there being insufficient evidence to
Ibid, 113.
Slbid, 114. The "Boulevard Law" consists of the following statutes:
Md. Code (1951), Art. 661/2:
"198. (Vehicle Entering Through Highway or Stop Intersection.)
(a) The driver of a vehicle shall come to a full stop as required by this
Article at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right
of way to other vehicles approaching on said through highway."
"207. (Vehicles Must Stop at Through Highways.) (a) The State
Roads Commission with reference to State and county highways, and
local authorities with reference to other highways under their jurisdic-
tion may designate through highways and erect stop signs at specified
entrances thereto or may designate any intersection as a stop intersec-
tion and erect like signs at one or more entrances to such intersection.
"(c) Every driver of a vehicle shall come to a full stop at such sign
or at a clearly marked stop line before entering an intersection and
yield the right of way to vehicles approaching on the intersecting
highway except when directed to proceed by a peace officer or traffic
control signal."
'Md. Code (1951), Art. 66%A, Sec. 199:
"(Entering Paved Public Highway From Unpaved or Private Road.)
The operator of a vehicle entering a paved public highway, which is
hereby defined to be a highway having a hard, smooth surface, com-
posed of gravel, shells, crushed stone, paving blocks, asphalt, concrete
or other similar substance, from an unpaved public highway, or from
a private road or drive, shall come to a full stop upon reaching the
intersection, and yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on
such paved public highway."
5 Supra, n. 1, 118.
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prove Mrs. Shriner guilty of contributory negligence or
negligence under the doctrine of "last clear chance", ver-
dicts should have been directed in favor of the Shriners.
To this extension of the interpretation of the "boule-
vard law" Judge Hammond entered a vigorous dissent,6
stating that he "would remand the case for new trial on
proper instructions to the jury".7
Streets and intersections are generally governed by the
statutory rule of right of way.' By statute,9 however, the
general rule has been modified,"° in the case of through
highways." In a series of cases12 which defined the "boule-
vard law", the Maryland Court of Appeals construed the
purpose13 of the statute as designed "to accelerate the flow
6 Ibid, dis. op. 120.
7 Ibid, 126.
8 Md. Code (1951), Art. 662, Sec. 196:
"(Vehicle Approaching or Entering Intersection.) (a) Except as
hereinafter provided, all vehicles or trackless trolleys shall have the
right of way over other vehicles or trackless trolleys approaching at
intersecting public roads from the left, and shall give right of way to
those approaching from the right.
"(b) The foregoing rules are modified at through highways and
otherwise as stated in this Article."
See also: Rabinovitz v. Kilner, 206 Md. 455, 112 A. 2d 483 (1955) ; Legum
v. Hough, 192 Md. 1, 63 A. 2d 316 (1949). This subject Is discussed in,
Due and Bishop, Automobile Right of Way in Maryland, 11 Md. L. Rev. 159
(1950). As to pedestrians right of way, see Md. Code (1951), Art. 66%,
See. 201, and State v. Belle Isle Cab Co., 194 Md. 550, 71 A. 2d 435 (1950),
noted in 13 Md. L. Rev. 64 (1953). This subject is discussed in, Due and
Bishop, Motorists and Pedestrians - A Study of the Judicial Process in
Relation to the Statutory Right of Way Law in Maryland, 11 Md. L. Rev.
1 (1950).
9 For statutes, see ns. 3 and 4, supra.
10 Modifications to create preferences in certain streets must be made by
statute in Maryland. Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505, 508, 192 A. 356
(1937) ; see also: 5 Am. Jui. 668, Automobiles, See. 301.
U Md. Code (1951), Art. 66', See. 2, sub-sec. 59:
"(Through Highway.) Every highway or portion thereof at the en-
trances to which vehicular traffic from Intersecting highways is re-
quired to stop and yield right-of-way before entering or crossing the
same and when stop signs are erected as provided in this Article."
Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 131, 8 A. 2d 888, 136 A. L. R. 1485 (1939),
noted In 4 Md. L. Rev. 207 (1939), provides:
"... the general right of way rule at Intersections, cannot be accepted
as controlling the decision here, [a 'boulevard' case] because under the
statute a special and more positive right of way rule controlling traffic
on and across 'stop' streets supersedes the general right of way rule
to which they apply."
"2 Greenfeld v. Hook, ibid; Pegelow v. Johnson, 177 Md. 345, 9 A. 2d 645
(1939) ; Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505, 192 A. 356 (1937) ; Blinder v.
Monaghan, 171 Md. 77, 188 A. 31 (1936) ; Motor Tours v. Becker, 165 Md.
32, 166 A. 434 (1933).
"It is interesting 'to note that the Court In Blinder v. Monaghan, ibid,
83. referred to it as the "manifest" purpose; in Greenfeld v. Hook, supra,
n. 11, 125, as the "obvious and essential" purpose; and in Brooks v.
Childress, 198 Md. 1, 10, 81 A. 2d 47 (1951), as the "primary" purpose.
The characterization of "primary" purpose has since been repeated. Shriner
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of traffic over through highways"14 on "which traffic may
move without interruption or delay". 5 To carry out this
intent, the mandatory duties of stopping and yielding the
right of way are correlated and coordinated so that the
unfavored driver enters the intersection at his risk." He
must come to a full stop at "stop" streets 7 and ascertain,
through the use of reasonable care and diligence, whether
traffic is approaching thereon.'" If any traffic is approach-
ing, he must yield the right of way. 9 He is not negligent in
entering the through highway if, after following the pro-
cedure set out above, the way is clear;20 but if in fact the
way is not clear the failure to yield the right of way after
stopping is negligence. If for any reason the unfavored
driver's view of the thoroughfare is obstructed so that he
cannot observe traffic approaching thereon, it is his duty
to wait until the obstruction clears, or to take adequate
measures to overcome or compensate for such obstruction
so as to determine if the way is clear." The duty of yielding
the right of way to vehicles on the favored way persists
throughout the passage across it.22 The unfavored driver
must always bear in mind that the favored drivers have
superior rights and will proceed rapidly, expecting to travel
along uninterruptedly.2"
Therefore, where the unfavored driver enters a boule-
vard disregarding these explicit and mandatory rules, and
collides with a traveller on the through highway, the col-
v. Mullhausen, 210 Md. 104, 117, 122 A. 2d 570 (1956) ; Sonnenburg v. Monu-
mental Tours, 198 Md. 227, 235, 81 A. 2d 617 (1951).
Greenfeld v. Hook, aupra, n. 11, 125.
'aBlinder v. Monaghan, 8upra, n. 12, 83.
10 Greenfeld v. Hook, supra, n. 11, 125.
11 Carlin v. Worthington, supra, n. 10. However, the unfavored driver is
not required to make two full stops, i.e., at building line and then at the
intersection. He need only stop at the intersection. See, Carrigan v. Ash-
well, 147 Wash. 597, 266 P. 686 (1928). It should also be noted that the
driver is not under a duty to stop at an intersection unless stop signs have
been erected there by the proper authorities. Houlihan v. McCall, 197 Md.
130, 78 A. 2d 661 (1951).
Greenfeld v. Hook, supra, n. 11, 132.
1 Ibid.
DCarlin v. Worthington, aupra, n. 10; McCulley v. Anderson, 119 Neb.
105, 227 N. W. 321 (1929).
Blinder v. Monaghan, supra, n. 12, 83.
Shriner v. Mullhausen, supra, n. 13, 114; Fowler v. De Fontes, ...
Md. ... , 128 A. 2d 395, 398 (1957) ; Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235, 239, 93 A.
2d 541 (1953) ; Brooks v. Childress, supra, n. 13, 10; Baltimore Transit Co.
v. O'Donovan, 197 Md. 274, 277, 78 A. 2d 647 (1951) ; Shedlock v. Marshall,
186 Md. 218, 235, 46 A. 2d 349 (1946).
0 Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 8 A. 2d 888 (1939), noted 4 Md. L. Rev.
207 (1940).
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lision will be attributed only to his negligence.24 The Court
"will not be diligent in submitting his [the unfavored
driver's] case to the consideration of a jury simply because
he unsuccessfully attempted to dodge the boulevard vehicle,
for plainly, to send such a case to the jury renders the
statute meaningless and the result is nothing more than
statutory repeal by the judiciary". 5 Since the passage of
the boulevard acts, the Maryland Court has consistently
held that the proximate cause of a collision between favored
and unfavored vehicles, is not the violation of some law by
the favored driver, but the entry upon the boulevard by
the unfavored driver in violation of the boulevard law.2"
The favored driver 7 has many "rights" which are
correlative to the "duties"2 of the unfavored driver. The
favored driver, without being considered negligent, may
assume that a driver on the unfavored road, marked with
a stop sign, will stop and yield the right of way.29 He is not
required to slow down at every intersecting road,3° nor
ordinarily, to anticipate that someone will negligently come
into his path.5 However, the statute was not "designed to
"Sun Cab Company, Inc. v. Cusick, 209 Md. 354, 121 A. 2d 188 (1956) ;
Brooks v. Childress, 198 Md. 1, 81 A. 2d 47 (1951) ; State v. Gosnell, 197
Md. 381, 389, 79 A. 2d 530 (1951) ; Baltimore Transit Co. v. O'Donovan,
supra, n. 22.
2Madge v. Fabrizio, 179 Md. 517, 521, 20 A. 2d 172 (1941).
"Madge v. Fabrizio, ibid. See also the cases cited in n. 24, supra.
It is interesting to note that the Maryland Court recently held that a
driver who made a left turn onto a boulevard from a stop street was the
favored driver, where -the jury decided that he had completed his turn, as
to other vehicles or streetcars entering the intersection in an attempt to
cross the boulevard from the opposite direction on the unfavored street.
Baltimore Transit Company v. Sun Cab Company, 210 Md. 555, 124 A. 2d
567 (1956).
"The terms "rights", "duties", and "correlative" are used In the Hoh-
feldian sense. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGxL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING (1923), which was discussed in Goble, A Redefinition
of Basio Legal Terms, 35 Col. L. Rev. 535 (1935).
2Madge v. Fabrizio, supra, n. 25; Rinehart v. Risling, 180 Md. 668, 674,
26 A. 2d 411 (1942) ; Shedlock v. Marshall, supra, n. 22, 235; Belle Isle Cab
Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174, 180, 49 A. 2d 537 (1946) ; Baltimore Transit Co.
v. O'Donovan, supra, n. 22; State v. Gosnell, supra, n. 24, 390; Brooks v.
Childress, supra, n. 24, 10; Sun Cab Co., Inc. v. Hall, 199 Md. 461, 86 A.
2d 914 (1952) ; Ness v. Males, 8upra, n. 22, 239; Hickory Transfer Co. v.
Nezbed, 202 Md. 253, 261, 96 A. 2d 241 (1953).
10 Sun Cab Co. v. Cusick, 8upra, n. 24, 359; Ness v. Males, supra, n. 22,
239; Shedlock v. Marshall, supra, n. 22; Rinehart v. Risling, ibid, 674;
Madge v. Fabrizio, supra, n. 25. It should be noted that even slow, dan-
gerous, and caution signs on the favored highway are of no effect and put
no burden on the favored driver to slow down. Sonnenburg v. Monumental
Tours, 198 Md. 227, 236, 81 A. 2d 617 (1951) ; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt,
ibid, 181.
aHickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed, supra, n. 29, 261; Shriner v. Mull-
hausen, 210 Md. 104, 116, 122 A. 2d 570 (1956) ; Sun Cab Co. v. Hall, supra,
n. 29, 446.
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change the established law of negligence so as to relieve the
favored driver of all duty to use care"2
As an abstract proposition, it is said that he is liable for
injuries or damages resulting from an accident proximately
caused by his negligence in the operation of his car at an
intersection, but, although the favored driver may have
been negligent, he is not liable for injuries which were not
proximately caused by his negligence.3 However, in situa-
tions where the rule was tested, the Court of Appeals held
that excessive speed,34 reckless driving,31 or driving to the
left of the center of the road, 6 were not the proximate
cause of the accident. It may safely be said therefore, that
the favored driver can do no wrong, except when he
observes the unfavored driver entering the boulevard in
clear violation of the boulevard law; then if the favored
driver has the opportunity to avoid a collision but does not,
he is guilty of negligence.37  This, therefore, embodies in
the boulevard cases the philosophy of the doctrine of the
last clear chance.38
82 Shriner v. Mullhausen, ibid. See also Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed,
ibid, 261, where the court said:
"... while a driver on a boulevard is not relieved of the duty of
exercising care, yet in determining what is due care his right to assume
that he has the right of way is an important factor."
"Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, supra, n. 29. Ordinarily these questions of
proximate cause are for the jury, but they may be so clear as to be deter-
minable by the court. See State v. Marvil Package Co., 202 Md. 592, 601,
98 A. 2d 94 (1953).
"Sun Cab Company, Inc. v. Cusick, 209 Md. 354, 121 A. 2d 188 (1956);
Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235, 93 A. 2d 541 (1953) ; Brooks v. Childress, 198
Md. 1, 81 A. 2d 47 (1951). Even to the extent of intentional racing, see
State v. Gosnell, 197 Md. 381, 79 A. 2d 530 (1951).
"Sun Cab Company v. Cusick, ibid; Brooks v. Childress, ibid; State v.
Gosnell, ibid; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, supra, n. 29.
"Md. Code (1951), Art. 66%, Sec. 182, provides that, subject to certain
specific exceptions, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of all road-
ways of sufficient width. But a violation of this rule does not constitute
negligence except when it is the direct and proximate cause of the injury
or accident. Sun Cab Co. v. Cusick, supra, n. 34; Cocco v. Lissau, 202 Md.
196, 95 A. 2d 857 (1953) ; Crunkilton v. Hook, 185 Md. 1, 42 A. 2d 517 (1945).
I" State v. Marvil Package Co., supra, n. 33; Sun Cab Co., Inc. v. Hall,
supra, n. 29; Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218, 48 A. 2d 349 (1946). On
the extreme difficulty of proving the negligence of a statutorily "favored"
driver in Maryland, see Recent Decision, 16 Md. L. Rev. 175 (1956).
"Defined and discussed in PRossER, LAW OF ToRTs (2d ed., 1955) 291-296,
and in articles and notes referred to herein, supra, ns. 8 and 11.
In the most recent cases on the doctrine of the last clear chance the Court
of Appeals has said:
"... that the doctrine is only applicable when the defendant's negli-
gence in not avoiding the consequences of the plaintiff's negligence is
the last negligent act; and, cannot be invoked when plaintiff's own
act is the final negligent act, or Is concurrent with defendant's
negligence."
Meldrum v. Kellam Distributing Company, ... Md ... , 128 A. 2d 400, 404
(1957). In a companion case, which concerned the unfavored driver's duty
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In the Shriner case, the Court relied upon the general
proposition of statutory construction that court decisions
construing a statute become part of it until the statute is
changed by the Legislature.9 Because the wording of Sec-
tion 199° is practically identical with the boulevard stat-
utes, the Court reasoned by analogy that the interpreta-
tions of the latter apply equally to the former."' The result
of this extension of the rights and duties under the boule-
vard cases is that a driver on a private or unpaved road or
driveway, unmarked by stop signs, who enters a paved road
and collides with a vehicle traveling thereon, is guilty of
negligence as a matter of law. 2
The extension of the boulevard cases to unpaved or
private roads appears to be sound as a matter of logic. In
both cases the unfavored driver must stop and yield the
right of way before entering the favored way. The fact
that the unfavored road is unpaved or privately owned
should give the same degree of notice of these duties as
does a stop sign. Since the primary duties of the unfavored
driver in the unpaved or private road situation are the
same as those of the unfavored driver in the stop sign situa-
tion, and, the wording of the statutes creating those primary
duties are "practically identical",4" it follows that the same
construction ought to apply.
Judge Hammond's fears that the policy is an unwise one
when applied to the shell roads of the tidewater areas and
to yield the right of way to the favored driver as persisting throughout his
passage across the boulevard, the Court held that:
"One is guilty of concurrent negligence who negligently occupies a
position of known danger, and continues to occupy it until injury
results, when he could by reasonable care and diligence have escaped
therefrom in time to have avoided the injury, and where the other
person, the defendant, although he knew of plaintiff's position, may
reasonably have inferred that he would move to a place of safety in
time to escape injury."
Fowler v. De Fontes, ... Md ... ,128 A. 2d 395, 399 (1957).
8What is presently Md. Code (1951), Art. 66%, See. 199 (supra, n. 4),
came into being in the Acts of 1943, Chap. 1007, Sec. 179. The wording of
the boulevard statutes, dealing with the duty of stopping and yielding the
right of way, appeared first in the Acts of 1929, Chap. 224, and, although
there have been a large number of cases construing it, the Legislature has
allowed it to remain unchanged.
"... [Where the Legislature has acquiesced in the Judicial con-
struction of a statute, there is a strong presumption that the intention
of the Legislature and the words used by It have been correctly inter-
preted, and as said in Nutwell v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 205
Md. 338, 343, 108 A. 2d 149, 151: '... such an interpretation ought not
to be disregarded but upon the most Imperious grounds'."
Shriner v. Mullhausen, 8upra, n. 32, 115.
,0 For text see n. 4, supra.




ULLMAN v. UNITED SPATES
to the "up hill and down dale winding country roads of
Garrett County or Carroll County"" appear to be a matter
more for Legislative attention than judicial. One must not
lose sight of the fact that a court in construing a legislative
enactment must determine legislative intent and not the
relative merits of one or more legislative policies.
STANLEY L. SELIGMAN
The Spirit Of The Fifth Amendment Privilege
A- Study In Judicial Method
Ullmann v. United States'
William Ludwig Ullmann, ex-Treasury Department
official, at the command of a subpoena appeared before a
duly consituted Southern District of New York grand jury
that was investigating membership and activities of the
Communist Party. Ullmann refused to answer pertinent
questions, asserting instead, his privilege against self-in-
crimination. The United States Attorney, deeming Ull-
mann's testimony vital to the public need, countered with
a new Congress-bestowed weapon, sub-section (c) of the
Immunity Act of 1954.2 With the approval of the Attorney
General of the United States application was made to the
Federal District Court for an order to compel Ullmann to
answer. By the terms of the new Act,' immunity from
"Ibid, dis. op. 120. His argument in ithis instance would seem to be its
own refutation. From a practical standpoint, is it not essential that a
driver on one of these "washboard" roads, or on a hilly and winding road
be able to focus his attention on the road itself, and not have to worry
about others "popping out" from dirt roads or private driveways?
1 350 U. S. 422 (1956).
SPub. Law 600, 83rd Cong., 68 Stat. 745, 18 U. S. C. A. Sec. 3486 (1956).
For an informative discussion of the climate of opinion prior to the passage
of the Act see Boudin, The Immunity Bill, 42 Georgetown L. J. 497 (1954).
It is apparent that popular clamor, spurred by such shibboleths as "Fifth
Amendment Communist", had engendered suggestions that the privilege be
modified, restricted or even abrogated to aid in the investigation of sub-
versive activity. The Congressional response was the Immunity Act of 1954.
Congress is not inexperienced in drafting immunity statutes, More than
twenty such statutes have been passed as adjuncts to Federal economic
regulations to assist in obtaining information helpful in operating the
agencies created by such regulations. For a tabulation of some of these
statutes see Shapiro v.'United States, 335 U. S. 1, 6 (1948).8 Ibid:
"(c) Whenever in the Judgment of a United States attorney the
testimony of any witness, or the production of books, papers, or other
evidence by any witness, in any case or proceeding before any grand
Jury or court of the United States involving any interference with or
19571
